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Intrusion Detection in SDN-based Networks:
Deep Recurrent Neural Network Approach
Tuan Anh Tang, Des Mclernon, Lotfi Mhamdi, Syed Ali Raza Zaidi and Mounir
Ghogho
Abstract Software Defined Networking (SDN) is emerging as a key technology
for future Internet. SDN provides a global network along with the capability to
dynamically control network flow. One key advantage of SDN, as compared to the
traditional network, is that by virtue of centralized control it allows better provision-
ing of network security. Nevertheless, the flexibility provided by SDN architecture
manifests several new network security issues that must be addressed to strengthen
SDN network security. So, in this paper, we propose a Gated Recurrent Unit Re-
current Neural Network (GRU-RNN) enabled intrusion detection system for SDN.
The proposed approach was tested using the NSL-KDD and CICIDS2017 dataset,
and we achieved an accuracy of 89% and 99% respectively with low dimensional
feature sets that can be extracted at the SDN controller. We also evaluated network
performance of our proposed approach in terms of throughput and latency. Our test
results show that the proposed GRU-RNN model does not deteriorate the network
performance. Through extensive experimental evaluation, we conclude that our pro-
posed approach exhibits a strong potential for intrusion detection in the SDN envi-
ronments.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The current Internet architecture has been developed for nearly three decades and
is now becoming an increasingly complex system. It is largely decentralised, au-
tonomous and built from a large number of network devices such as routers,
switches and numerous types of middleboxes (e.g., firewall, load balancing, etc.)
with several complex protocols implemented on each of them. These network de-
vices are traditionally developed by several manufacturers. Each manufacturer has
their own designs, firmware and other software to operate their own hardware in a
proprietary and non co-operative way. Consequently, current Internet architecture
lacks the agility to respond to ever changing demands and the dynamic nature of
modern day applications. Software Defined Networking (SDN) [21] is introduced
as a promising architecture, enabling scalability and unprecedented flexibility in
the configuration and deployment of network services. The separation of control
and data planes provides more flexibility and greater control over the traffic flows.
Nevertheless, as highlighted in [13], the SDN architecture also introduces various
security issues pertaining to the control plane, the control-data interface and the
control-application interface. Recently, as mentioned in [14] and [26], SDN secu-
rity has become a serious concern and attracted significant interest.
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is one of the most important network secu-
rity tools. IDSs can be broadly classified into two categories : Signature-based IDS
and Anomaly-based IDS. The signature-based IDS uses the signature database of the
previous attacks to detect the new attacks. This system gives a low false alarm rate
but it fails to detect zero-day attacks. The operational efficiency of the signature-
based IDS is strongly coupled with the integrity and freshness of signature infor-
mation available in databases. Maintaining such databases incurs huge operational
overhead and is difficult if not impossible to realize in real-time. The anomaly-
based IDS tries to identify the observation that deviates from the baseline model.
Thus, this system can detect zero-day attacks better than the signature-based IDS.
Various approaches have been proposed for intrusion detection like artificial neu-
ral networks (ANNs), support vector machines (SVMs), and Bayesian approaches.
However, these techniques have a quite high false alarm rate and associated com-
putational cost as mentioned in [28]. Recently, Deep Learning (DL) has emerged
as a new approach and achieved a huge success in computer vision and language
processing areas. DL has the ability to process raw data and learn the high-level
features on its own, and so DL delivers higher accuracy than traditional machine
learning techniques. The flow-based nature of SDNs enables network information
acquisition in real-time via the OpenFlow [16] protocol. Consequently, flow-based
intrusion detection systems have recently attracted significant attention in the con-
text of SDNs.
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1.2 Contribution
Following the trajectory of current research, we believe that deep recurrent neural
networks can potentially offer better solutions for implementation of IDS under the
context of SDN. Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) have shown great success in
language modelling, text generating and speech recognition. We believe that the
RNN is a powerful technique that can represent the relationship between a current
event and previous events and then enhance the anomaly detection rate. In this chap-
ter, a Gated Recurrent Unit Recurrent Neural Network (GRU-RNN) is proposed to
detect the anomaly traffic traces.
In summary, the major contributions of this chapter are the following:
• We introduce an IDS in the SDN environment using GRU-RNN. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to use GRU-RNN for intrusion detection
in the SDN environment.
• Our GRU-RNN approach yields a detection rate of 89% in the NSL-KDD dataset
using a minimum number of features compared to other state-of-the-art ap-
proaches. This gives our approach significant potential for real time detection.
The GRU-DNN achieves an impressing detection rate of 99% dealing with DDoS
attacks in the CICIDS2017 dataset.
• We also evaluate the network performance of our proposed approach in the SDN
environment. Then results show that our approach does not significantly degrade
the SDN controller’s performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a literature
review. In Section III, we give a system description. Section IV presents the intru-
sion detection performance and network performance analysis. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper and presents future work.
2 Literature Review
2.1 What is Software Defined Networking?
The idea of programmable networks has been proposed as a way to facilitate the
evolution of the conventional network. The idea of programmable networks and
decoupled control logic has been around for several years. In general, SDN is built
under four principles:
• Seperation of Control and Data Plane: these planes must be logically separated
and connected via an interface. The control aspect is removed from forwarding
devices and delegated to an external entity.
• Network Programmabitity: The provision of open API is a core aspect of the
SDN architecture. Software and scripts should be able to access, configure, and
modify network elements with ease.
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• Network Abstraction: the view of the network is virtualized for any elements of
a higher hierarchy. Services and applications are aware of the state of the whole
network, but physical attributes and resources are irrelevant for configurations
and computations.
• Logically Centralized Control: all forwarding devices of a domain are linked to
a controlling entity and are subjected to its enacted policies.
SDN is defined by the Open Networking Foundation (ONF) which was founded
in 2011 by Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Verizon and Deutsche Telekom.
As of 2015 the organization has more than 150 industry members and receives en-
dorsement by several network equipment vendors such as Cisco, Dell, Brocade and
HP. An SDN architecture decouples the network control and forwarding functions
enabling the network control to become directly programmable. The separation of
the control plane from the data plane lays the ground for the SDN architecture.
Network switches become simple forwarding devices and the control logic is im-
plemented in a physical or logical centralized controller. The logical centralized
controller dictates the network behaviour and offers several benefits. Firstly, it is
simpler and less error-prone to modify network policies through software from a
single place without reconfiguring individual devices. Secondly, a control program
can automatically react to dynamic changes of the network and thus maintain the
high level policies in place. Thirdly, the centralised control logic has global knowl-
edge of the whole network, including the network topology and the state of the
network resources, thus giving the flexibility and simplifying the development of
more sophisticated network functions. For example, the controller can dynamically
adjust flow tables to avoid congestion or apply different routing algorithms to dif-
ferent types of traffic.
The SDN architecture is divided into three layers: infrastructure layer, control
layer and application layer.
• Infrastructure layer (Tier-1): This layer consists of the forwarding hardware such
as switches/routers.
• Control layer (Tier-2): Network intelligence is installed in software-based logi-
cally centralized SDN controllers. The control layer regulates and manages for-
warding hardware. The controller is the core of SDN networks. It lies between
network devices at the one end and the applications at the other end. The SDN
controller takes the responsibility of establishing every flow in the network by
installing flow entries on switch devices.
• Application layer (Tier-3): Application and services take advantage of the control
and infrastructure layer. Conceptually the application layer is above the control
layer and enables easy development of network applications. These applications
perform all network management tasks . Some examples of SDN application are
load balancers, network monitors, and intrusion detection systems (IDS).
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2.2 Security in SDN
The SDN concept was originally designed with significant advantages over the tradi-
tional networking. Even though SDN brings significant advantages to network secu-
rity, it also introduces new targets for potential attacks. The main causes of concern
actually lie in SDN’s main benefits: network programmability and control logic cen-
tralization. These capabilities actually introduce new fault and attack planes, which
open the doors for new threats that did not exist before or were harder to exploit. Ac-
cording to Kreutz et al. [14], there are seven main potential threat vectors identified
in SDN and summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 SDN Threat Vectors
No. Threat Vector
1 Forged or faked traffic flow
2 Attacks on vulnerabilities in switches
3 Attacks on control plane communications
4 Attacks on and vulnerabilities in controllers
5 Lack of mechanisms to ensure trust between the controller and management application
6 Attacks on and vulnerabilities in administrative stations
7 Lack of trusted resources for forensics and remediation
Among these seven threat vectors, number 3,4 and 5 are not present in traditional
networking. They are specific to SDNs as they arise from the separation of the con-
trol and data plane and the logical centralization of the controllers. Other vectors
were already presented in traditional networking. Threat vector number 5 would
have the most severe impact on SDN architecture because it could affect the en-
tire network. The controller emerges as a potential single point of attack. Attackers
can attack vulnerabilities of controllers and run several dangerous scripts. There-
fore, if there are no security settings to protect the controller, it would be under the
control of attackers. The controller provides an interface for SDN applications to
manage the network. However, this also give chances for malicious SDN applica-
tions to take over the network because of the lack of trust between the controller
and SDN applications. Malicious hosts also can cause severe damage to the SDN
architecture. Malicious hosts can perform Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to con-
trollers and other hosts or network topology poisoning. DoS attack is one of the
most dangerous attacks in SDN. It can be done by flooding the network with a large
number of forged packets. These packets would trigger the switches to send a large
number of requests to the controller for new flow rules. Therefore the control chan-
nel bandwidth and the controller CPU resources will be heavily consumed. As a
result, the controller would respond slowly to legitimate requests. At the same time,
the switches would also suffer from traffic congestion because the packets could
quickly exhaust the memory of the flow table storage in the switches. Compro-
mised switches not only have the same capabilities as the malicious hosts, but they
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are also capable of performing more dynamic and severe attacks. Firstly, they can
be used for traffic eavesdropping. Both data and control flows passing through the
compromised switches can be replicated and sent to the attacker for further process-
ing. Furthermore, the attacker can interfere with the control traffic passing through
the compromised switches to perform man-in-the-middle attacks. By doing so, the
attacker can act as the controller to some target switches.
2.3 Related Work
Researchers have employed classical machine learning approaches such as SVM, K-
Nearest Neighbour (KNN), ANN, Random Forest, etc., for intrusion detection for
several years. These proposed methods have achieved various degrees of success
while also exhibiting some inherent limitations. Parwez et al. [22] employ K-means
and hierarchical clustering to detect anomalies in call detail records (CDRs) of mo-
bile wireless networks data. In [19], Bayesian networks are employed for anomaly
and intrusion detection such as DDoS attacks in cloud computing networks. Bang et
al. [2] use Hidden semi-Markov models to detect LTE signalling attacks. Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) and SVM are also combined in [10] to detect intru-
sions. PCA is used for dimensional reduction on network data and SVM is used to
detect intrusion on those data. These work only focus on traditional network with
a large set of features that cannot be applied to SDNs. These classical mechanisms
are still employed for intrusion detection in the context of SDN.
Braga et al. [3] present a lightweight approach using a Self Organizing Map
(SOM) to detect Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in the SDN. This
approach based on six traffic flow features gives quite high detection accuracy. In
[17], the authors use four traffic anomaly detection algorithms (threshold random
walk with credit based rate limiting, rate limiting, maximum entropy and NETAD)
in the SDN environments. The experiments indicate that these algorithms perform
better in the SOHO (Small Office/Home Office) network than in the ISP (Internet
Service Provider) and they can work at line rates without introducing any new per-
formance overhead for the home network.
In the literature, the DDoS attacks are some of the most focused attacks for the
SDN context because of their severe effects. The controller is a single point of fail-
ure in the SDN architecture. Therefore, if intruders trigger the DDoS attacks on the
controller and take control of it, they can also control the whole network. Support
Vector Machine (SVM) is also a quite popular algorithm for its high detection accu-
racy. In [12] and [24], SVM is used to detect DDoS attacks quite efficiently. Winter
et al. [31] train a one-class SVM with a malicious dataset in order to reduce the false
alarm rate. K-Nearest Neighbour and graph theory are combined to classify DDoS
attacks from benign flows in SDNs by AlEroud et al. in [1]. Mousavi et al. [18] pro-
pose an early DDoS attack detection method against the SDN controller based on
the variation of the entropy of the flow’s destination IP addresses. They assume that
the destination IP addresses are evenly distributed for the benign flows, while the
Deep Recurrent Neural Networks for SDN-based Intrusion Detection Systems 7
malicious flows are destined for a small amount of hosts. Thus, the entropy drops
dramatically when any attack happens. In [20], the authors propose a deep learning
based approach using a stacked autoencoder (SAE) for detecting DDoS attacks in
the SDN. They achieve a quite high accuracy rate and low false alarm rate on their
own dataset.
In 2016, we applied a Deep Neural Network (DNN) under the context of SDNs
to train and test the NSL-KDD dataset [29]. We obtained a potential accuracy of
75.75% with just six basic features. In this paper, we continue this trend by using
GRU-RNN to improve the detection accuracy and reduce the false alarm rate of the
system.
3 Methodology/System Description
In this section, the Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) and Gated Recurrent Units
(GRUs) are briefly reviewed. Then the architecture of the SDN-based IDS is de-
scribed in detail.
3.1 Recurrent Neural Networks
A RNN is an extension of a conventional feed forward neural network. In general,
a neural network architecture is as shown in Fig. 1.
The RNN is called ”recurrent” because it performs the same task for every ele-
ment of a sequence, with the output being dependent on the previous computations.
Mathematically, the hidden states of the RNN are computed as:
ht = σ(Wxt +Uht−1 +bh), t = 1,2, . . . , T, (1)
where σ(·) is a non-linearity function, xt is an input row vector at time t, ht is a
hidden state row vector at time t, W is an input to hidden weight matrix, U is a
hidden to hidden weight matrix, and bh is a row vector bias term.
The Backpropagation Through Time (BPTT) algorithm is used for training the
RNN. However, BPTT for the RNN is usually difficult due to a problem known as
vanishing/exploding gradient [9]. Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) [8] networks
and GRUs [5] were proposed to solve this problem and are among the most widely
used models in DL.
GRUs are selected in our research because of their simplicity and faster training
phase compared to LSTMs [7].
For a GRU the activation ht is computed differently from (1) as follows:
ht = (1− zt)ht−1 + zt h̃t , t = 1,2, . . . , T, (2)
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Fig. 1 The Deep Neural Network Structure
where an update gate zt defines how much of the previous memory to keep and h̃t
is the candidate activation. The update gate is computed by
zt = σ(xtWz +ht−1Uz). (3)
The candidate activation h̃t is computed by
h̃t = tanh(xtWh +(ht−1 ⊙ rt)Uh), (4)
where a reset gate rt determines how to combine the new input with the previous
activation vector and ⊙ is an element-wise vector multiplication. The reset gate is
computed by
rt = σ(xtWr +ht−1Ur), (5)
where σ(·) is again a non-linearity function in (3) and (5). Finally, all the W and U
terms are learned weight matrices.
3.2 System Architecture
As mentioned earlier, the SDN decouples the control plane and data plane from net-
work devices. The data plane, termed as switches, is just simple packet forwarding
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elements. The control plane can be either a single computer or a group of logically
centralized distributed computers. The two entities communicate in order to ex-
change network information and manage the whole network. In principle, the SDN
network works in the following manner: packets from the internet traverse an SDN
switch under the control of the SDN controller. Switches have flow tables for flow
rules that contain match-fields, counters and actions that control traffic flows in the
network. If the arriving flow does not match any rule in the SDN switch, the switch
will send a packet-in message with the arriving flow header’s information to the con-
troller. The controller sends back a packet-out or flow-mod message to the switches
to instruct them how to process the corresponding flow. Applications that run inside
a controller can program the data plane for different purposes such as firewall, load
balancer, IDS, etc. This paper focuses on the use of the SDN paradigm as network
infrastructure for intrusion detection.
The IDS is implemented as an application on the SDN controller. The SDN-
based IDS architecture is described in Fig. 2. It has three main components: Flow
Collector, Anomaly Detector and Anomaly Mitigator.
• Flow Collector: This module is triggered when a packet-in message arrives. It
will extract all the flow statistics such as protocol, source and destination IP and
source and destination port. This module is also triggered by a timer function to
send a ofp flow stats request message to switches to request all the flow statistics
information. Once the request is received, a ofp flow stats reply message, which
contains all the aggregated statistics of all flow entries, is sent back to the con-
troller. All the features needed for anomaly detection will be created from these
statistics and sent to the Anomaly Detector module.
• Anomaly Detector: We have chosen the GRU-DNN algorithm for the core of the
Anomaly Detector module in this paper. The anomaly detector module loads a
trained model, receives the network statistics and decides if a flow is an anomaly
or not.
• Anomaly Mitigator: Through the Anomaly Detector’s results, the Anomaly Mit-
igator module can make decisions on what to do with the flow. For example, it is
possible to immediately stop the flow in order to prevent possible further attacks
or to mirror the traffic to a deep packet inspector to further analyze the flow.
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Fig. 2 SDN-based IDS Architecture
4 Performance Analysis
In this section, we firstly describe all datasets used in our experiment. Secondly, we
explain all metrics used to evaluate our model performance. Thirdly, we describe
all experimental setups. Detection results are given and compared with other works
for a better overview in next section. Finally, the network performance of our
GRU-RNN is evaluated and analyzed.
4.1 Datasets
Currently, there are only a few public datasets available for IDS evaluation (i.e.,
KDD Cup 99, NSL-KDD, DAPRA, and ISCX 2012) and none of them are specified
for the SDN architecture. The KDD Cup 99 [11] and NSL-KDD datasets are some
of the most popular datasets used in the literature to assess the NIDS performance.
As mentioned in [15], the KDD Cup 99 has several inherent problems that makes
the classifier fail to deliver a better accuracy. The NSL-KDD dataset [30] is intro-
duced by Tavallaee et al. to solve these problems. However, the above datasets are
out of date, lack traffic diversity and feature sets. Recently, the CICIDS2017 dataset
[27] was published to deal with these issues. The SDN architecture is still under de-
velopment, and so the NIDS dataset for the SDN is still quite rare and unpublished.
Several researchers still use the conventional dataset to evaluate their approaches.
In this paper, the NSL-KDD and CICIDS2017 datasets are chosen to evaluate our
particular method.
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4.1.1 NSL-KDD Dataset
The NSL-KDD contains 125,973 and 22,544 records in the training set and testing
set respectively. Each traffic trace in this dataset has 41 features that are categorized
into three types of features: basic, content-based and traffic-based features. Attacks
in this dataset are categorized into four categories according to their characteristics.
Our IDS is trained by the KDDTrain+ dataset and tested by the KDDTest+ dataset.
In addition, the KDDTest+ dataset contains 18 different types of attacks in addition
to 22 attack types out of the KDDTrain+ dataset. Details of each attack category
are described in Table 2. Thus, the KDDTest+ dataset is a reliable indicator to the
performance of the model on zero-day attacks as well.
Table 2 Attacks in The NSL-KDD Dataset
Category Training Set Testing Set
DoS back, land, neptune, pod, smurf,
teardrop
back, land, neptune, pod, smurf, teardrop, mail-
bomb, processtable, udpstorm, apache2, worm
R2L fpt-write, guess-passwd, imap,
multihop, phf, spy, warezclient,
warezmaster
fpt-write, guess-passwd, imap, multihop, phf,
spy, warezmaster, xlock, xsnoop, snmpguess, sn-
mpgetattack, httptunnel, sendmail, named
U2R buffer-overflow, loadmodule,
perl, rootkit
buffer-overflow, loadmodule, perl, rootkit, sqlat-
tack, xterm, ps
Probe ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, satan ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, satan, mscan, saint
Within the context of SDN, the packet content is not directly accessible in the
current OpenFlow protocol. The OpenFlow protocol does not allow us to get all the
41 features in the NSL-KDD dataset. This leads to a reduction of the features for the
anomaly detection. So we just focus on the basic features and traffic-based features
of the NSL-KDD dataset. Some of the features in these two categories can be easily
retrieved from the SDN switches. In our research, a mixed feature set that contains
six features from both the basic feature and traffic-based feature set are selected out
of 41 features of the NSL-KDD dataset. The selected feature are (duration, pro-
tocol type, src bytes, dst bytes, srv count, dst host same src port rate).These are
SDN related features. Table 3 shows details of these features. These features are
selected based on their SDN related nature without any feature selection or opti-
mization algorithms.
The NSL-KDD dataset contains both the numerical and symbolic features, and
so we will transform the symbolic features into numerical values. After converting,






,x > 0, (6)
where x
′
is the normalized value and x is the original value.
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Table 3 The NSL-KDD’s Feature Description
Feature Name Description
duration Length (number of seconds) of the connection
protocol type Type of the protocol (e.g. tcp, udp, etc.)
src bytes Number of data bytes from source to destination
dst bytes Number of data bytes from destination to source
srv count Number of connections to the same service as the current
connection in the past two seconds
dst host same src port rate Number of connections that were to the same source port
4.1.2 CICIDS2017 Dataset
The CICIDS2017 dataset covers seven types of common attack families (i.e., Brute
Force Attack, Heatbleed Attack, Botnet, DoS Attack, DDoS Attack, Web Attack,
and Infiltration Attack). In this chapter, we choose a Wednesday dataset focusing
on DoS, Heartblead, Slowloris, Slowhttptest, Hulk and GoldenEye Attacks. These
types of attacks are on the rise and are a major threat to the SDN architecture.
In this dataset, we use 622,265 and 69,141 records for training and testing sets
respectively. We extract a subset of nine features out of 80 features of this dataset
for our research. These features have an SDN-related nature and can be extracted
easily by SDN controllers. Details of these features can be seen in Table 4. This
dataset is also normalized into the range of [0-1] by the Min-Max scaling as with
the NSL-KDD dataset.
Table 4 The CICIDS2017’s Feature Description
Feature Name Description
Source Port Source port of the flow
Destination Port Destination port of the flow
Protocol Protocol type of the flow
Flow Duration Duration of the flow in microsecond
Fwd Packet Length Mean Mean size of packets in forward direction
Flow Bytes/s Number of flow bytes per second
Flow Packet/s Number of flow packets per second
Flow IAT Mean Mean inter-arrival time of packets
Fwd Packet/s Number of forwarded packets per second
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4.2 Evaluation Metrics
In order to evaluate our proposed approach, Precision (P), Recall (R), F1-measure
(F1) and Accuracy (ACC) metrics are used. These metrics are calculated by using
four different measures - True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive
(FP) and False Negative (FN), defined as follows:
• TP: the number of anomaly records correctly classified.
• TN: the number of normal records correctly classified.
• FP: the number of normal records incorrectly classified.
• FN: the number of anomaly record incorrectly classified.
So the four metrics are:
Accuracy (AC): the percentage of true detection over total traffic records,
AC =
T P+T N
T P+T N +FP+FN
×100%. (7)












F1-measure (F1): the harmonic of the precision and recall metrics to express the









According to our experiments, A DNN with three hidden layers gives best results in
all experiment cases. Therefore, we propose a GRU-RNN with three hidden layers.
For the training phase, the batch size and epoch number are 100 and 1000 respec-
tively. We use a Nadam optimizer [28] and Mean Squared Error (MSE) function
for the model. In addition, we added L1-regularization to our model to prevent over
fitting during the training phase. A DNN is also implemented with the same struc-
ture as the proposed GRU-RNN. We used Keras [6] to implement our GRU-RNN,
DNN, and VanilaRNN models. Scikit-learn library [23] is used to implement the
SVM algorithm and measure all the evaluation metrics.
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4.4 Experiment Results
To start with, we present the anomaly detection performance of our proposed model
in terms of Precision, Recall, F1-measure and accuracy on the NSL-KDD dataset.
Details of the results given in Table 5 show that our GRU-RNN performs well for all
the evaluation metrics. Both the legitimate and anomaly traffic traces are detected
really well by the GRU-RNN. The detection rates of the legitimate and anomaly
traffic traces is 89% and 90% respectively. The anomaly detection accuracy of 90%
shows that the GRU-RNN is good at detecting zero-day attacks.
Table 5 Performance Metric Evaluation for the NSL-KDD Dataset
Class Name Precision (%) Recall (%) F1-measure (%)
Legitimate 87 89 88
Anomaly 91 90 90
We also compare the performance of our proposed model with other popular
algorithms like VanilaRNN, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and DNN using the
same subset of six features. As we can see in Fig. 3, the GRU-RNN outperforms
other algorithms in all the evaluation metrics. The GRU-RNN yields good results
for both legitimate and anomaly traffic traces, while other algorithms just work well
in only one class.
Fig. 3 Performance Metric Comparison
The results in Table 6 show that our approach outperforms other methods in
terms of accuracy. The DNN, coming in second place, shows the potential of the
DL approach in anomaly detection. The VanilaRNN gives the worst result compared
with its counterpart GRU-RNN.
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GRU-RNN (Proposed Model) 89%
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is also presented to evaluate
our proposed approach. The ROC curve is created by plotting the false positive
rate versus the true positive rate. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is used
to determine which classifier predicts the classes best. The higher the AUC, then
the better is the classifier. Fig. 4 shows that the proposed GRU-RNN achieves the
highest AUC amongst all the tested algorithms with a True Positive Rate of 90% and
a False Alarm Rate of 10%. The VanilaRNN gives the worst result as expected. As
we can see, the GRU-RNN has a lowest False Positive Rate which is an important
factor of the IDS.
Fig. 4 ROC Curve Comparison for Different Algorithms
The Precision vs Recall curve shows the trade off between Precision and Recall
for different thresholds. A high area under the curve represents both high recall and
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high precision. An ideal system with a high area under the curve will return many
results, with all results labelled correctly. As seen in Fig. 5, the GRU-RNN gives
us the best results amongst all the algorithms. As the Recall threshold increases, the
Precision decreases significantly for all the algorithms, except for GRU-RNN where
increases Precision increases to 89%.
Fig. 5 Precision vs Recall Curves
Furthermore, we also compared the performance of our proposed model with
others in the literature. Our GRU-RNN is compared with other state-of-the-art al-
gorithms like SVM, DNN and NB Tree algorithms. The NB Tree gave the best
result in [30]. The results in Table 7 show that our proposed model outperforms all
the previous methods. Our GRU-RNN performs better than the SVM and NB Tree
algorithms that use the whole set of 41 features for training and testing. The GRU-
RNN result also indicates a significant improvement in accuracy compared to the
basic DNN in our previous work.
Table 7 Accuracy Comparison with Previous Studies
Method Accuracy
SVM [30] 69.52%
DNN [29] 75.75 %
NB Tree [30] 82.02%
GRU-RNN (Proposed Model) 89%
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For further investigation, we evaluate the GRU-DNN performance as regards de-
tecting DDoS attacks in the CICIDS2017 dataset. We compare the proposed GRU-
DNN with DNN and ID3 algorithms. Results of ID3 algorithm are the best achieved
from the CICIDS2017 dataset in [27]. Table 8 gives details of our evaluation. As
can be seen, the proposed GRU-DNN has better results in all the evaluation metrics
compared with the best result from [27]. The DNN yields slightly lower results than
that of the ID3. The proposed GRU-DNN can work well with diverse and complex
traffic traces and detect almost all types of DDoS attacks in the CICIDS2017 dataset.
Table 8 Performance Metric Evaluation for the CICIDS2017 dataset
Method Precision Recall F1-measure
DNN 97% 97% 97%
ID3 [27] 98% 98% 98%
GRU-RNN (Proposed Model) 99% 99% 99%
From the above results, the GRU-DNN shows its strong potential in dealing with
low-dimensional and raw traffic. Therefore, it is a potential solution for intrusion
detection in the SDN paradigm.
4.5 Network Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effect of our proposed GRU-RNN on the perfor-
mance of the POX controller in the SDN environment.
4.5.1 Experiment Setup
The GRU-RNN is implemented as an application written in Python language in a
POX [25] controller. Cbench [4] is a standard tool used for evaluating the SDN
controller performance. Cbench runs in two modes: throughput and latency modes.
• The Throughput Mode: a stream of packet-in messages is sent to the controller for
a specified period of time to compute the maximum number of packets handled
by the controller.
• The Latency Mode: a packet-in message is sent to the controller and then waits
for the reply to compute the time needed to process a single flow by the controller.
We ran our experiments on a virtual machine having an Intel Core i5-4460
3.2GHz with 3 cores available and 8GB of RAM. The operating system is Ubuntu
14.04 LTS-64bit. The controller performance is tested with a different number of
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virtual OpenFlow switches emulated by Cbench. The performance of the POX con-
troller running stand-alone is considered as a baseline for our evaluation. We also
compare the proposed GRU-RNN algorithm with the DNN algorithm in our previ-
ous work [29].
4.5.2 Experiment Results
Throughput evaluation indicates the performance of the controller under heavy traf-
fic conditions. Fig. 6 depicts the average response rate of the controller under three
testing scenarios. As we can see, both the DNN and GRU-RNN cause overhead on
the controller. The DNN algorithm is simpler than the GRU-RNN, and so it gives a
slightly better network performance than that of the GRU-RNN. However, the GRU-
RNN outperforms the DNN in terms of the detection accuracy. The affect of the
GRU-RNN on the controller performance is predictable. The network throughput
decreases slightly when the network size increases from 32 switches to 64 switches.
The network performance degrades by about 3.5% when the network size is under
32 switches. When we increase the size to over 64 switches, the throughput drops by
about 4%. The overhead on the controller of the GRU-RNN module is unavoidable.
The GRU-RNN module has to send several ofp flow stats request messages and
process ofp flow stats reply messages while processing packet-in messages. How-
ever, the throughput degradation is quite low and can be improved in the future.
Fig. 6 Throughput Evaluation
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Latency evaluation indicates the length of time that the controller takes to process
one single packet. As we can see in Fig. 7, the network latency increases along with
increasing the network size. When we increase the network size, the load on the
controller is increased as well and this causes the overhead. The GRU-RNN still
has the highest overhead amongst all. It takes time for the GRU-RNN to process
the ofp flow stats reply messages, packet-in messages and detect anomaly flows, so
the overhead is unavoidable. The overall degradation is about 7% in all cases. This
overhead is not significant and can be improved in the future.
Fig. 7 Latency Evaluation
All in all, the overhead caused by the GRU-RNN on the SDN controller is quite
low, and so our proposed approach has significant potential for real-time intrusion
detection in the SDN paradigm. So there is a trade off between performance and
security. However, the network performance still can be improved in the future.
5 Conclusion
This paper has made an attempt to briefly introduce the SDN architecture and its
security issues. DL has great potential to be the key technology for intrusion de-
tection in SDN. Despite the recent wave of success of DL in computer vision and
language processing areas, there is a scarcity of DL applications in solving SDN
security issues. In this chapter, we present an Anomaly-based IDS in the SDN en-
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vironments using the GRU-RNN algorithm. We show that our proposed approach
outperforms other state-of-the-art algorithms with an accuracy of 89% and 99% for
the NSL-KDD and CICIDS2017 datasets. Our scheme uses a minimum number of
features compared to other state-of-the-art approaches so computational costs can be
reduced significantly. In addition, the network performance evaluation showed that
our proposed approach does not significantly affect the controller performance. This
makes our model a strong candidate for real-time detection. In the future, we will
optimize our model and use other features to increase the accuracy and reduce the
overhead on the controller. We will also try to extend our research to unsupervised
intrusion detection approaches.
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